Legal philosophy, certainly in the Anglophone world and increasingly outside it, has been dominated for more than a half-century by H.L.A. Hart's 1961 book The Concept of Law (Hart 1994 [the 2
we might adopt will inevitably confront borderline cases, it follows, he says, that " [f] or Hart, there is no essence to the phenomena we call 'law'…" (Green 1996 (Green : 1692 . There may of course be properties essential to laws or legal systems even if there are no necessary and sufficient conditions. Hart claims, for example, that any society with a legal system must have a rule of recognition, though he does not think the existence of a rule of recognition is sufficient for a legal system, though it is essential. Admittedly, Hart was deeply influenced by a tradition in post-WWII Anglophone philosophy associated with J.L. Austin, Gilbert Ryle, and the later There are therefore two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system. On the one hand, those rules of behavior which are valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed, and, on the other hand, its rule of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity…must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behavior by its officials. (Hart 1994: 116) The passage admits, it seems, of only an essentialist reading. The existence of borderline cases, even in light of passages like the preceding, might just signal our inability to settle certain evidentiary questions: that we do not know where to locate the borderline cases does not mean there is no fact of the matter about where the border lies. We will proceed, then, on the assumption that Hart's theoretical ambitions are to explain and clarify the general features of modern legal systems, at least some of which rise to the level of essential properties. And this is certainly how he has been understood by his followers. Julie Dickson, for example, following Joseph Raz, says that, necessarily true, and (2) adequately explain the nature of law….I am using "the nature of law" to refer to those essential properties which a given set of phenomena must exhibit in order to be law. (Dickson 2001: 17) She is echoed more recently by Scott Shapiro, who says that in inquiring into "the fundamental nature of law" we want to "supply the set of properties that make (possible or actual) instances of
[law] the things that they are" (2011: 8-9 ) and offers the example of water being H2O: "Being H2O is what makes water water. With respect to law, accordingly, to answer the question 'What is law?' on this interpretation is to discover what makes all and only instances of law instances of law and not something else " (2011: 8-9 ). In addition, says Shapiro (here again echoing Dickson who is following Raz), "to discover the law's nature" is also "to discover its necessary properties, i.e., those properties that law could not fail to have " (2011: 9) .
How does Hart propose to fulfill the ambitions of producing a theory that is both general and descriptive? This brings us to his claim to be engaged in both linguistic analysis and descriptive sociology. The Concept of Law is not a piece of empirical social science, as any quick skim through its pages would confirm. All Hart means when he says his theory is a piece of descriptive sociology is that his goal is to give an adequate account of a particular kind of social institution, namely law. But how does linguistic analysis fit into the picture, and how does it relate to the descriptive sociological project? The type of linguistic analysis Hart has in mind is roughly the type associated with the ordinary language philosophers of post-war Oxford University, though Hart's claim to be engaged in this kind of project can be somewhat misleading. Unlike the ordinary language philosophers, Hart rarely argues explicitly for a position on the basis of some observations about the appropriateness of various expressions for a given context (his discussions of the difference between 'being obliged' and 'having an obligation', and between 'nullity' and 'sanction' are important exceptions, in which the implicit method becomes explicit [Hart 1994: 82-83, 33-35] ).
However, his method does reflect the overall spirit of ordinary language philosophy: that we can gain philosophical insight about some phenomenon by attending to the conceptual distinctions we use to talk and think about it. In the preface to the The Concept of Law, Hart characterizes the relationship between this type of linguistic analysis and descriptive sociology as follows:
Notwithstanding its concern with analysis this book may also be regarded as an essay in descriptive sociology; for the suggestion that inquiries into the meanings of words merely throw light on words is false. Many important distinctions, which are not immediately obvious, between types of social situation or relationships may best be brought to light by an examination of the standard uses of the relevant expressions and of the way in which these depend on a social context, itself often left unstated. In this field of study it is particularly true that we may use, as Professort J.L. Austin said, 'a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of the phenomena'. (Hart 1994: vi, emphasis added) The key to understanding Hart's method-and thus its influence on subsequent legal philosophy--is to understand the precise sense in which we can use a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our awareness of legal phenomena. Hart was convinced that it is especially true of social phenomena like law that we can employ linguistic analysis to understand their nature. On its face, this seems puzzling: why should the actual nature of a social phenomenon be hostage to how ordinary people talk? A short detour into the metaphysics of social reality may provide a rationale, though not the one Hart had in mind.
For Hart, legal systems are socially constructed (cf. Green 1996 (cf. Green : 1687 (cf. Green , 1691 . To understand the philosophical import of that claim, it will prove helpful to introduce some ideas from John Searle's influential work on the "construction of social reality" as he calls it (Searle 1995 (Searle , 2009 he satisfied the criteria for occupying such a role that are set out by the public power-conferring rules (partly specified in the U.S. Constitution) for becoming a justice of the Supreme Court.
The imposition of these statuses or functions is accomplished through collective recognition of rules of the form "X counts as Y in context C," where the X term specifies some physical object or objects and the Y term specifies some status or function that things satisfying the X term cannot have in virtue of their satisfaction of the X term. These are what Searle calls constitutive rules (Searle 1995: 43-49; 2009: 9-10, 96-98) , and they play a particularly important role in Hart's theory. As we mentioned above, one of Hart's most important contributions to legal philosophy is the idea that a norm is legally valid in a given legal system if and only if it satisfies the criteria specified by the rule of recognition of that system. backed by threats of sanction) relies heavily on the claim that we need the concept of a powerconferring rule to explain various legal phenomena (rights, wills, contracts, etc.) and that command theories cannot explain such rules without distortion (Hart 1994: 40-42, 48-49) . The distinction is also called on to explain the nature of secondary rules of change and adjudication.
Hart's argument for this distinction is simply this:
Such power-conferring rules are thought of, spoken of, and used in social life differently from rules which impose duties, and they are valued for different reasons. What other tests for difference in character could there be? (Hart 1994: 41) In other words, all we need to know in order to distinguish these two types of rules is that they play different roles in social life, and the fact they play such different roles is exhausted by the way we conceptualize and talk about those roles. Our "talk" and the behavior that accompanies that talk is the evidence of the differing social roles and indeed explains the distinction itself.
Hart's method can now be summarized by the following claims: (1) a theory of law should be an account of the essential properties of modern legal systems in general; (2) a theoretical account of law's essential properties can proceed without consideration of its value or reason-giving force; (3) legal systems are socially constructed, and a theory of law is therefore a theory of the social facts about beliefs, attitudes and actions that constitute a legal system; (4) this social construct is amenable to linguistic analysis, given that it is constituted by language;
and (5) given that law is socially constructed, a general theory of law is just an attempt to elucidate the folk concept of law, that is, the concept manifest in the language we use to think and talk about it.
Objections to Hart's Methodology
We shall consider in this section several lines of objection to Hart's influential approach to the problems of legal philosophy. One line of objection questions the fruitfulness of the methodology of conceptual analysis, as described above. Another line of objection largely accepts the method of "linguistic" or "conceptual" analysis, but questions whether there is a concept of law there that can simply be "described." We take these up in turn.
A. The Naturalistic Challenge
In many areas of philosophy, doubts about the kind of conceptual and linguistic analysis (ii) rules requiring people to compensate those whom they injure in certain ways; (iii) rules specifying what must be done to make wills, contracts or other arrangements which confer rights and create obligations; (iv) courts to determine what the rules are and when they have been broken, and to fix the punishment or compensation to be paid; (v) a legislature to make new rules and abolish old ones. (Hart 1994: 3) In other words, we can expect the (educated) folk concept of law to identify these as the real features of legal systems. Hart's method is, thus, clearly a form of immodest conceptual analysis in Jackson's sense, but (and this is key) it has to be since the concept, as manifest in our language, constitutes the social construct of law! Hart's theory may rely somewhat less obviously on intuitions about possible cases than many contemporary legal philosophers do (like Joseph Raz, Matthew Kramer, and Scott Shapiro), but it is still the case that on Hart's theory we can derive knowledge about the actual nature of law by analyzing our shared concept of it as manifest in ordinary language.
Of course, there is more to elucidating a folk concept than opinion polling or intuition pumping, and there has to be conceptual space for revision to the concept. Folk reports about some phenomenon are not an infallible guides even to the folk concept of that phenomenon (and for obvious reasons: they can be unreflective, inconsistent, etc.). As Searle points out, a society can go about creating and sustaining institutions without being aware that this is what they are doing (Searle 1995: 47) . In particular, the members of a society can fail to be conscious of the patterns of collective agreement that constitute their own institutions. This could be because social institutions tend to evolve over time, such that there is no discernible point in a society's history when its members engage in any overt act of social construction. A society might also fail to be conscious of these collective agreements because they do not even realize that some institution of theirs is in fact socially constructed (gender roles are a relevant example here).
Nevertheless, these collective agreements are an important part of the folk concept, and it is the theorist's job to bring them to light. We find that this is the best way to understand Hart's introduction of the concept of a rule of recognition. The idea that what makes any norm legally valid in a given legal system is its satisfaction of the criteria specified by a social rule (namely, the rule of recognition) is not intuitively obvious to the ordinary person. Indeed, it is not even intuitively obvious to legal professionals or many legal philosophers! But the idea of a rule of recognition is implicit in our folk concept of law, and introducing it into one's theory is necessary to make sense of other familiar features captured by the folk concept according to
Hart.
Conversely, Hart aims to rid the folk concept of certain inconsistencies. For example, it certainly seems to be part of the folk understanding of law that legal systems guide conduct primarily through coercion or the threat of coercion (indeed, Hans Kelsen, the other great theorist in the modern positivist tradition, thought coercion was essential to law!). Hart was surely aware of the prevalence of this belief, but he is explicit that it is mistaken:
Plainly we shall conceal the characteristic way in which such rules function if we concentrate on, or make primary, the rules requiring courts to impose the sanctions in the event of disobedience; for these latter rules make provision for the breakdown or failure of the primary purpose of the legal system. They may indeed be indispensable but they are ancillary. (Hart 1994: 39) In other words, while the use of coercion is an important feature of legal systems (bordering on the indispensable), we will fail to do justice to other important features of the folk concept-such as the idea that law can impose obligations--if we overstate its role. So, for Hart, the legal theorist's task is to elucidate the folk concept of law, but this involves throwing light on implicit features of our concept that may go unnoticed by the ordinary person.
Ordinarily, naturalists worry that "folk" intuitions about the extensions of concepts can not be informative as to the actual nature of their referents since what the folk believe is hostage to ignorance and other epistemic infirmities. Naturalists typically defer to the more epistemically robust methods of the various sciences: if our best physics says that space can be non-Euclidean, then Kant's "a priori" intuiion about the structure of space be damned! Why not think the same is true of law? Why not defer to our best social scientific theory of law and legal phenomena to demarcate what law really is?
One difficulty, of course, is that there is not, at present, an epistemically robust social science of law and legal phenomena (cf. Leiter 2007: 192) . But Joseph Raz has given a different kind of answer to this challenge:
In large measure what we study when we study the nature of law is the nature of our own understanding. The identification of a certain social institution as law is not introduced by sociologists, political scientists, or some other academics as part of their study of society. It is part of the self-consciousness of our society to see certain institutions as legal. And that consciousness is part of what we study when we inquire about the nature of law. (Raz 2009: 31) This rejoinder to the naturalist, however, seems weaker than Hart's position actually allows. It is not just that law "is part of the self-consciousness of our society to see certain institutions as legal," it is that--per Hart's actual method and Searle's related account of socially constructed reality-that law really is what society, or some subset of society ("officials" of the system in Hart's terminology), "understands" it to be, perhaps not self-consciously of course, but in terms of what is manifest in their practices and attitudes, which are made manifest in their language
Again, consider the case of money. In fact, money is a concept of interest to sociologists, political scientists and other scholars who study social and economic orders. But the fact that some piece of metal or paper is money (such that it admits of empirical study) is prior to the claims of sociologists and political scientists, and is, per Searle, constituted by the attitudes of people in that society. If law is the same, then the argument against the naturalist is that the metaphysics of a social fact like law precludes deference to the empirical sciences, since the way people use and understand the concept just constitutes the fact in question. Interestingly, this "metaphysical" defense of Hart's methodology-which is the methodology of almost all legal philosophy these days-is not one offered by Hart himself or any of his many followers. Yet it may be the best way to resist the familiar kind of naturalistic worries about "immodest" conceptual analysis (for such worries in the jurisprudential context, see Leiter 2007: 175-81, 183-199 ).
Yet this kind of argument does not wholly deflect the naturalist's challenge. For a naturalist can reasonably allow that a social phenomenon like law is, at least in the first instance, individuated by shared beliefs and attitudes, and still press the point that the "folk" concept of the phenomenon ought to be revised in light of whatever refined understanding of the phenomenon is explanatorily and predictively fruitful. After all, even the proponent of Hart's basic methodological posture allows that the understanding of the "folk" needs revision in various ways, as long as it doesn't forego some core of folk commitments. The Razian rejoinder, then, that we want to "understand our own self-understanding" is neither here nor there-the latter is a fine topic for social psychology and anthropology, but if it turns out that sacrificing parts of the folk concept yields a more powerful theoretical understanding of law as a phenomenon in human societies, why should we prefer Razian hermeneutics? A different kind of philosophical naturalist, the experimental philosopher, can also properly object at this point that if a theorist really wants to "understand our own self-understanding," she ought to adduce There is no master argument for methodological positivism. It is a hypothesis about how parsimonious a theory of law can be, and it is supported to the extent that an explanatorily adequate theory can be given consistent with that hypothesis. Methodological anti-positivism on the other hand must be motivated by some perceived shortcoming in positivist theories of law, and the present line of objection attempts to locate one. We have already surveyed Hart's answer to that question. The salient features of law are the ones picked out as salient by the folk concept. Since the folk concept of law constitutes the phenomenon to be explained, this is as principled as a judgment of salience could hope to be.
The theorist does not have to accept all the folk explanations of these features, because these can fail to track the folk concept for the reasons we mentioned above. But descriptive adequacy to what the "ordinary man" knows about law is the touchstone for the theory. Why do we need to privilege the moral point of view to identify the central case of law?
According to Finnis, this point of view is the one "that brings law into being as a significantly differentiated type of social order and maintains it as such" (Finnis 2011: 14) . Other points of view "will, up to a point, maintain in existence a legal system…if one already exists. But they will not bring about the transition from the pre-legal (or post-legal!) order…" (Finnis 2011: 14) .
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We are merely trying to describe Finnis's argument here, though it is clear it misdescribes Hart's argument. Hart's argument is not that the point of view of those who treat the law as obligatory is morally superior to the point of view of the Holmesian "bad man," it is that it is descriptively false that everyone, legal officials included, adopts the point of view of the "bad man."
If this is an empirical claim about how legal systems emerged in human history, it is both implausible and unsupported. More importantly, it is also of unclear relevance to the question what the concept of law in modern societies is. But perhaps Finnis does not mean it as an empirical claim; he also says that it is only from the moral point of view that it is "a matter of overriding importance that law as distinct from other forms of social order should come into being, and thus become an object of the theorist's description" (Finnis 2011: 15, emphasis added). The suggestion, it seems, is that we can only assess the good reasons for having law from the moral point of view. That might be true, but it is, again, unclear why we need to know the good reasons for having law in order to assess which of its features are important for the legal theorist. There appears to be no answer to this question that does not beg the question against methodological positivism. The answer cannot be that we cannot understand law without understanding its moral value, for that is precisely what this argument is supposed to show. It is hard to resist the conclusion that Finnis has simply changed the subject: what began as an argument about how to justify judgments of salience has now become an argument about how to assess the moral value of law, with no motivation for linking the two considerations (see Leiter 2007: 167-68 for a related objection).
Liam Murphy presents a different kind of objection to descriptive jurisprudence (Murphy 2001). According to Murphy, although there is widespread agreement about many aspects of law, there is also intractable disagreement about many of the most important questions of legal theory. Murphy cites the pervasive disagreement among legal theorists over whether the laws of any given system can be determined by moral criteria as opposed to facts about the behave and attitudes of officials as evidence of the thinness of our folk concept (Murphy 2001: 381) . The existence of intractable disagreement about such issues implies that the folk concept will be silent about them, and so we cannot hope to answer these questions by analyzing our shared concept of law. Therefore, a successful theory of law cannot be merely a descriptive theory of the folk concept of law, because such a theory will be rather obviously incomplete. Finally, we turn to Ronald Dworkin's challenge to methodological positivism. He rejects methodological positivism on the grounds that the concept of law is an interpretive concept. On Dworkin's view it is a crucial feature of the folk concept of law that it includes what he calls an "interpretive attitude." Participants in a social institution evince an interpretive attitude towards that institution just in case (1) they see it as having some value or as serving some purpose, and (2) they take the requirements of that institution to be partly determined or constrained by what would count as fulfilling that purpose (Dworkin 1986: 47) . Law satisfies the first condition because the participants in a legal system generally take their law to serve the purpose of justifying state coercion (Dworkin 1986: 98, 109) . In Dworkin words, " [l] aw insists that force not be used or withheld…except as licensed or required by individual rights and responsibilities flowing from past political decisions about when collective force is justified" (Dworkin 1986: 93) . (All positivists deny this, and Dworkin never offers any satisfactory explanation for what is essentially a stipulation on his part.) Law satisfies the second condition because the participants take this scheme to be partly determined by the principles of political morality that do in fact justify the use of coercion in light of past political decisions. More concretely, it is Dworkin's view that a society's law is the scheme of rights and duties that figure in or follow from the explanation that best fits and best justifies that society's institutional history (i.e. its legislative enactments, judicial opinions, constitution, etc. Dworkin believes that law's interpretive nature has profound implications for the methodology of legal philosophy. In particular, all "useful" theories of law for Dworkin must themselves be constructive interpretations of some particular society's institutional history (Dworkin 1986: 102, 108-10) . The legal theorist's task on this view is to offer an account of what the law of his or her community is, or a theory of how disputes about the law are to be decided in that community. "Jurisprudence," Dworkin says, "is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision at law" (Dworkin 1986: 90 Dworkin's strongest argument for understanding law as an interpretive concept claims that it allows us to make better overall sense of the actual practices of judges, lawyers, and other legal professionals. 8 In particular, it does a better job of explaining the existence and nature of 6 It justifies the institutional history with respect to the purpose of justifying state coercion.
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"Soft" positivism, which allows that the rule of recognition could incorporate moral criteria of legal validity, actually faces the same problem, one of several reasons for thinking that Hart was mistaken in his posthumous "Postscript" in thinking that was a viable response to Dworkin's early criticisms.
8 Dworkin also offered the argument known as the "the semantic sting." In Law's Empire, Dworkin argues that all non-interpretive theories of law must be theories of the semantics of legal terms (Dworkin 1986: 31-44) . He furthermore takes all such theories to be committed to a criterial semantics: the thesis that an analysis of the theoretical disagreements about law. Disagreement about the law is, of course, a familiar fact, but Dworkin observes that these disputes can come in two forms. A theoretical disagreement is a disagreement about the criteria of legal validity of a particular legal system, i.e. about what makes a particular proposition of law true in a given society. For example, if we agree that the speed limit on Lakeshore Drive is 45 mph but disagree about whether the fact that the city council's vote suffices to make it so, we are having a theoretical disagreement. This type of disagreement contrasts with what Dworkin calls empirical disagreement about the law, in which parties agree about the criteria of legal validity but disagree about whether those conditions set out by those criteria have been satisfied. Thus if we agree that a city council vote would suffice to make the speed limit on Lakeshore Drive 45 mph, but disagree about whether such a vote has actually taken place, we are having an empirical disagreement.
Dworkin argues that theoretical disagreement is a significant feature of law, citing, in particular, disagreement about the canons of statutory interpretation among (American) appellate court judges as evidence. Moreover, positivists appear to have a difficult time accounting for this type of disagreement. If positivism is correct, then whatever counts as law in a particular society is determined exclusively by facts about official behavior and attitudes, the social facts that constitute the rule of recognition. If officials do not, in fact, converge on the criteria of legal validity, then there is no fact of the matter about what the criteria of legal validity are, and therefore no fact about which to have a genuine disagreement. Positivists therefore appear to be committed to saying that in all cases of theoretical disagreement, the parties to the disagreement are either mistaken or disingenuous (Leiter 2009 (Leiter : 1224 Shapiro 2011: 290-91) . And if meanings of legal terms is an analysis of the shared criteria used by lawyers, judges, and other legal professionals to apply these terms (Dworkin 1986: 35-36) . But this combination of views is untenable, because it cannot adequately explain the fact that legal professionals often disagree about what the law is. "Semantic theories", as Dworkin calls them, are committed to saying that when professionals disagree about whether some proposition of law is true (e.g. "it is illegal to drive over 45 mph on Lakeshore Drive"), they must be using different criteria to apply the relevant legal terms. But then it follows that they must mean different things by their terms, and that they therefore are not really disagreeing, which is absurd (Dworkin 1986: 43-45) . All non-interpretive theories fall prey to this semantic sting, and the only plausible alternative to a semantic theory of 'law' is an interpretive theory.
The semantic sting fails in myriad ways, as several commentators have observed (see Raz 2001, Coleman and Simchen 2003, and Shapiro 2007 for a thorough discussion). Most immediately, there is no reason to think that all non-interpretive theories of law are committed to criterial semantics, as they must be if they are to be stung by Dworkin's argument. More generally, there is no reason why all non-interpretive theories must be theories of the semantics of legal terms. Indeed,, Hart specifically disavows any real concern with the norms governing the application of legal terms in the opening sections of The Concept of Law. Dworkin must be basing this conclusion on Hart and others' endorsement of linguistic analysis as an important tool of legal theory. However, the usefulness of linguistic analysis, as we saw earlier, is not limited to its ability to elucidate the meanings of terms. __-__ ). Furthermore, appellate courts choose to hear these cases precisely because of their novelty relative to typical legal disputes. They tend to be cases that stand out because they point to areas where the law is particularly unclear or unsettled. By contrast, the vast majority of cases never make it to trial or never make it onto the docket of a court of appeals precisely because 9 Some legal systems, in fact, have pedigreed interpretive rules for resolving such disagreements: e.g., in Canadanian constitutional law, an argument that appeals to the original intent of the drafters of the Charter is forbidden. [cite] . There can be no theoretical disagreement about this kind of interpretive issue in Canada, even though it is rife in American constitutional law. All of the objections to methodological positivism considered in this section are alike in that they each rely on premises about the existence of some form of disagreement, and that they each rely on premises that cannot be confirmed from the armchair. They are all motivated by some putative observations about social facts, observations for which there can be no a priori argument. We have offered some preliminary reasons for thinking that methodological positivism can survive these challenges, but ultimately these disputes can only be decided by closer attention to the social facts that all parties agree partly constitute a legal system.
Conclusion
We have focused in this essay only on the methodology for the central topics in philosophy of law: the nature of law and the relationship between legal and other norms, especially moral ones. But much work in philosophy of law concerns the "philosophical foundations" of substantive areas of law (criminal law, torts, contracts, and so on). This work has a great advantage over the work in the core of legal philosophy, because it has an undisputed datum: a substantive body of doctrine enacted by legislatures and courts in various jurisdictions.
The ambition of such work is almost always the same: to try to identify the moral coherence of the actual law. It also almost always confronts the same problem: the law is morally incoherent, since it has been created over a long period of time, by persons with many different interests and concerns. Thus this work typically shifts to an explicitly normative perspective, that raises the usual methodological issues in normative philosophy, but these are beyond the scope of this essay. We are grateful to Thomas Adams, Leslie Green and Mark Murphy for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
